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The boundary between intelligence and scholarship is notoriously permeable, sometimes 
to the benefit of both professions.  Michael Herman is the most significant figure to cross 
that border in recent years.  He is an old intelligence hand, who served throughout the 
Cold War at the British code breaking agency, GCHQ, and for two years as Secretary to 
the Joint Intelligence Committee.  After retiring from government service, he became a 
leading academic student of intelligence, attached at various times to Nuffield College, 
Oxford, and the War Studies Department at King's College, London, a regular and 
respected participant on the intelligence conference circuit and a contributor to specialist 
journals.  
Intelligence Power in Peace and War represents the culmination of his scholarship to 
date.  It is a study of intelligence as applied science, that mixture of theory, history, 
management, and criticism of the discipline familiar through well-known works by 
Sherman Kent, Scott Breckinridge, Roger Hilsman, Ray Cline, Walter Laqueur and 
Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman, among others.  Such works generally focus on 
whatever American experience and concerns were dominant in their day, on the OSS-
CIA tradition of collection and the American pattern of intelligence analysis and its 
impact on decision-making, and they treat these matters as universal norms.  Herman's 
study is different from these because he is unlike their authors.  He has a greater range 
and depth of experience than any of them, excepting Cline, and he is the first senior 
British officer and the first signals intelligence professional to produce this sort of study.  
This double first gives him room for greater perspective, which he exploits with unusual 
intelligence and power.  
Intelligence Power in Peace and War has one notable weakness on the theoretical side.  
The eponymous concept of "intelligence power" is illustrated in part but never explained 
in full, beyond a reference to Lawrence Freedman's vague definition that power is the 
"capacity to produce effects that are more advantageous than would otherwise have been 
the case."  Many of Herman's asides will assist the creation of a theory of intelligence (for 
example, "offensive intelligence superiority tends to produce better information security 
for its own side than the enemy's, and intelligence inferiority the reverse.  Good 
intelligence has defensive applications which degrade the enemy's collection"; as with 
blitzkrieg, "victory in the intelligence and security contest goes to whoever seizes the 
technical initiative, makes the first offensive breach and exploits it to the full," pp. 145, 
177), but these insights have not been presented as systematically as they might have 
been.  
Again, Herman discusses conceptual issues like images, perceptions, surprise, 
intelligence failures and successes, in a sound and thorough fashion, but not a particularly 
original one.  None the less, this work is an excellent blend of historical background, 
contemporary analysis, professional judgement and managerial sense, and his discussions 
of all these matters are better than those in any comparable study.  It rests on the best 
brief account of intelligence history between 1800 and 1997 on record.  It continues with 
well organized sections on sources, collection, processing, assessment, 
counterintelligence and security and the internal politics and the international relations of 
intelligence services, proffers a user's manual on the management of intelligence 
communities, and ends with a notable contribution to the genre of works on the future of 
intelligence.  Herman is entirely up to date with the literature, his views of its value are 
judicious and he synthesises it with effect.  The work requires careful reading -- not 
because it is written poorly; on the contrary -- but rather because the hasty reader will 
miss many gems of wisdom, that for example, "the most dangerous of an agent's weapons 
is uncontrolled access to a Xerox copier." (p. 65)  Many of Herman's off-hand 
observations -- that the meat and potatoes of Western signals intelligence during the Cold 
War was the production of a mass of material on Soviet and satellite military forces, or 
that "there is an element of macho satisfaction in an intelligence line of tough realism, 
free of delusions . . . it is more satisfying, safer professionally and easier to live with 
oneself and one's colleagues as a military hawk than as a wimp.  In the Cold War 
intelligence seemed more useful when demonstrating new Soviet military capabilities and 
causing something to be done about them, than from studying Soviet limitations" (p. 247) 
-- will assist the study of Cold War intelligence.  Even more, the work is a quiet polemic 
in the continuing debate between conservatives, liberal realists and libertarians regarding 
the role and value of intelligence in the Cold War, and about how the lessons of this 
history should be interpreted and enacted.  Herman expresses his arguments with effect 
and his criticisms in a characteristically gentle fashion, his critique of the Western 
intelligence performance during the Cold War era is persuasive, and his ideological 
sympathies are clear (Mrs. Thatcher would not have seen him as "one of us"; neither will 
Noam Chomsky).  This work is required reading for every specialist in the field and it 
should become the standard textbook for undergraduate courses in contemporary 
intelligence.  
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